The War and the Empire

Some Facts and Deductions

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SIR CHARLES LUCAS

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PREFACE

THESE notes have been written in connexion with the work and objects of the Imperial Studies Committee of the Royal Colonial Institute. They are intended more especially as suggestions for teachers when dealing with the effects of the war and the questions which it has brought into prominence.

C. P. LUCAS.

April 1919.

THE WAR AND THE EMPIRE

SOME FACTS AND DEDUCTIONS

THE lessons of the war for the British Empire will, for the most part, not be fully learnt and taught, until distance has given perspective and the war has receded further into the past; but there are some outstanding features, which can with advantage be emphasized here and now, while what has taken place is fresh in mind.

THE WAR AND THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE EMPIRE

During the war, for the first time and, in all probability, for the last—for it is to be hoped that no such wholesale war will again overturn mankind—the democracies of the Empire have, at the same time, to more or less the same extent, been faced with the same problems. To political, constitutional, historical students, on this ground alone, apart from the actual fighting and the actual results of the fighting, the war is of special interest, raising questions which are most difficult to answer, and suggesting answers based upon the differences in the democracies. Some few facts are given in the first place without attempting to draw conclusions.

If we take the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, omitting Newfoundland only because of its limited size and population, we have five democracies, each with its

own special type formed by its own special conditions, differentiated from one another by distance, climate, soil and physical features, presence or absence of a non-British white race, age and youth, long or short tradition, isolation from or neighbourhood to other peoples, and so forth. How did they respectively shape when the same things came to them at the same time?

In three out of the five democracies, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the same man was in each case Prime Minister throughout the war. In the other two, the United Kingdom and Australia, there was a change of Prime Minister, in Australia two changes. In only one of the five democracies, the United Kingdom, was there no General Election during the war. In Australia there were two General Elections. In only one of the five democracies, the Union of South Africa, was there no coalition Ministry; but in the other dual-nationality Dominion, Canada, the coalition was an imperfect coalition, seeing that, from first to last, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, whose recent death is matter for universal regret, led a regular and organized political opposition. The normal life of Parliament is five years in the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa, three years in Australia and New Zealand. In three out of the five democracies, the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand, the existing Parliament was kept alive beyond its normal term. The term was extended by law no less than five times in the United Kingdom, twice in New Zealand, once in Canada. In Australia and South Africa, no prolongation took place. Out of the four overseas democracies,

New Zealand alone had the power to prolong the life of her Parliament without having recourse to an Imperial Act. In the other three cases the number of years was fixed by the Imperial Acts which created their Federations or Unions, and only in the case of Canada was application made to the British Parliament and the necessary law passed. A second reference and a second law were contemplated, but, owing to difference of opinion in Canada, there was no further prolongation. In two out of the five democracies, the United Kingdom and South Africa, there was armed rebellion in the course of the war, if the Sinn Fein rising can be dignified by the name of rebellion. In both cases, though the war provided the occasion, there were long antecedent causes of disloyalty. In Canada, with its two races, and in all-British Australia and New Zealand, there was no trouble of the kind. In two out of the five democracies, Australia and New Zealand, adult women's suffrage prevailed before the war. In one, Canada, it came into existence during the war. In one, the United Kingdom, a large proportion of women were admitted to the vote during the war. In the fifth democracy, the Union of South Africa, there is still no women's vote, though here also the effect of the war has apparently been to strengthen the movement.

The Democracies and Conscription

Conscription was adopted, in one form or another, to a greater or less extent, in three out of the five democracies, in the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. It was twice rejected in Australia, and it was not attempted at all in the Union of South

Africa. It was adopted, where it was adopted, by normal Parliamentary machinery in each case. It was rejected, where it was rejected, by means of the referendum, not by defeat in Parliament or at a General Election. Where it was adopted—in the United Kingdom, the law was at first, in 1916, confined to Great Britain, and though, by the later law of 1918, power was taken to extend the compulsory system to Ireland, compulsion was not, as a matter of fact, brought into effect in Ireland. In Canada, the law was passed by the existing Parliament for the whole Dominion, but it was not put into force until the sense of the people had been taken at a General Election, and the measure had been ratified by a very large majority of the electors. In New Zealand, before the war, compulsory military training was already the law of the land. In the United Kingdom, the first of the democracies to adopt conscription, as far as Great Britain was concerned, compulsory military training before the war, though it had many and powerful advocates, including Lord Roberts, cannot be said to have come within the scope of practical politics ; and in Canada there was nothing of the kind. Where conscription was rejected—in Australia, and where it was not attempted—in the Union of South Africa, in either case, compulsory military training of one kind or another was the law of the land. Comparing in this matter the two dual-nationality Dominions, Canada and South Africa, in either case compulsory military service was perhaps more traditional in the non-British than in the British race, in the form of militia under the old French régime in Canada, and in

the form of the commando system among the Dutch in South Africa. In Canada, when the Dominion was created, the legal liability to serve in the militia was fully and explicitly retained in the law of 1868, the First Dominion Minister of Militia being a French Canadian, Sir George Cartier; and, though practically a dead letter, it has been retained ever since, being re-enacted with slight modification by Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Government. Yet in Canada the French Canadians were the great opponents of conscription, and in South Africa Boer feeling made it out of the question. Comparing the dual-nationality Dominion of Canada with the all-British Commonwealth of Australia, we have the curious fact that the all-British Dominion, where already compulsory military training was the active law of the land, twice rejected conscription, while the dual-nationality Dominion adopted it, although in Canada compulsory military training had no place, and the non-British element, led on this particular issue, not by a disloyal Nationalist, but by the greatest of French Canadians, former Prime Minister and whole-hearted for the war, was markedly and avowedly opposed to compulsory military service.

What possible conclusions can be drawn from this medley of seemingly contradictory facts? We may eliminate South Africa from consideration, as having been peculiarly conditioned by the still fresh memories of the South African War. In the first place, it may be inferred that personalities and individual leadership in democracies count for very much more than the democracies care to acknowledge, and the adoption or rejection of compulsory military service largely,

probably mainly, turned upon the men who handled the question and the ways in which it was handled. In the second place, in the oldest democracy, the mother democracy, which was at the same time the only one of the five democracies immediately within the danger zone, the traditional British instinct of meeting the actual need of the day, no more and no less, by practical compromise, was strongest and most widely shared by all classes. Conscription was held back, until it came by common consent, omitting the part of the realm where there was not common consent. In the third place, the democracy where conscription was twice rejected was the only one of the five democracies in which Labour was the predominant political power, predominant as a rule in Parliament as well as out of it. In all the democratic countries, large sections of Labour were averse to conscription, for it seems to be characteristic of Labour in its modern guise to be as strongly opposed to compulsion by law as it is strongly in favour of compulsion outside the law in connexion with its own organizations; and in Australia, while the Labour Prime Minister, with a considerable following of his best men, declared and worked for conscription, recalcitrant Labour, embittered by the fact that the proposal came from Labour's own ranks, was strong enough to defeat it twice over by the referendum. In the fourth place, the democracy in which conscription was rejected was the one democracy in which the full women's vote was polled on the issue. The question was not tested either by General Election or by referendum in the United Kingdom, and if it had been, there would have been at the time no

women's vote. In the Canadian General Election, in which the question was submitted to the people, a large number of female voters took part and polled heavily for conscription. They had, however, been newly enfranchised with special reference to war service and for the particular purpose of the coming election. A general extension of the suffrage to women throughout the Dominion did not take place until the following year. In New Zealand, as in Australia, all adult women were and are voters, but in New Zealand, as in the United Kingdom, Parliament decided without asking the vote of the people.

These considerations may, to some extent, account for what actually happened, but they leave outstanding further questions. Why is it that Labour has entered into its full Parliamentary heritage in Australia, while there has never been any Parliamentary Labour Party in Canada, nor, for the matter of that, in the Congress of the United States? It is true that New Zealand also differed from Australia in never having had an organized Parliamentary Labour Party until shortly before the war, when the rudiments of such a party appeared. But in this particular case the reason is fairly plain. Mr. Seddon, during his long term of office as Prime Minister of New Zealand, carried legislation as advanced as the most advanced Labour leader could hope or desire; the Dominion under the Liberal Party became the most ultra-democratic of all the democracies of the Empire, and no need was felt for a separate Labour Party. Possibly the difference between Canada and Australia in this particular respect may be explained by the two following facts.

In the first place, there has been a stream of immigrants into Canada, far greater in volume and much more continuous than the influx of immigrants into Au tralia; and the infinitely greater non-British element in the Dominion than in the Commonwealth may well have resulted in less readiness in the motley ranks of Canadian Labour to have recourse to the Parliamentary machinery, to which the instinct of a stable British population invariably turns. In the second place, an abnormally large proportion of the population is, in Australia, congregated in the great cities, which dominate Australia to an extent which is not the case in Canada; the mining centres, where again labour congregates, have relatively filled a more important place in Australia than in Canada; and outside the great cities and the mining centres, Australia has, in the past, been mainly a pastoral area, that is, a land of great proprietors employing labour. In Canada, on the other hand, a large proportion of the manual workers have worked on their own account as settlers and small proprietors. In other words, the country population of Canada has been a larger proportion of the total population than in Australia; in the country, as opposed to the town, labour, as a class, has tended to disappear; while the town population has been dispersed through more numerous and smaller city centres, making labour, for the purposes of political organization, less effective because less centralized.

Another question is as interesting as it is difficult to answer. Apart from the forces, whatever they were, behind the opposition to conscription in Australia, was its defeat immediately due to the particular method

taken to ascertain the popular will?—to the referendum? Is there reason to think that the results would have been different, if the issue had been presented at a General Election? We have the fact that between the two referenda, both of which negatived conscription, there was a General Election. At this election, the Coalition Government, who had tried to carry conscription and failed, pledged themselves not to carry it in Parliament without again taking the mandate of the people. Still they were avowedly in favour of the measure, and the election was fought hard by the Opposition. The result of the election was that the Government was returned by an overwhelming majority; they took the floor with non-conscription Labour and swept it out of the field. A few months later came the second referendum, with a second and an accentuated rejection of conscription. After the first and before the second rejection, the issue was joined in Canada, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier contended for a referendum on the subject in that Dominion, having, no doubt, in his mind what had taken place in Australia, the first referendum with its result and the General Election with its result. Sir Robert Borden took the path of the General Election and it brought him and conscription through. The inference seems to be that, had the method of the referendum not been adopted in Australia, conscription would have been carried in the Commonwealth as in Canada.

This suggests a further and final question. Does the referendum ascertain the popular will on a particular issue more accurately than a General Election? Obviously it concentrates the attention solely upon

the one question. Apparently it presents the question, and invites a decision upon it, exclusively on its merits. But is this so in living fact? The presentation of a single question does not in any way close the door to personal or party feeling for or against the man or party who propounded the question, and the answer given may be just as much simply the outcome of that feeling as at a General Election. How, again, can a question be presented and decided on its merits, when it is presented in a guise in which it never appears in real life? No question is isolated from all other questions, except on paper. How can anything be seen either by the eye or by the mind in true proportion, as it really is, on its merits, if it is detached from its surroundings and cannot be measured or compared? The referendum is congenial to ultra-democracy, because it is logical and uncompromising. The British race throughout its past history has been neither the one nor the other, and that has been the secret of its success in the practical world.

Militarism

The passing of the Conscription Act was regarded by the small Pacifist Minority in the United Kingdom as a melancholy triumph of militarism. By the very great majority of the citizens of all classes, it was accepted as a necessity, though not liked on its merits. For militarism has been a favourite bugbear of the labour democracy in these islands, and for this reason, before the war, the Empire was not a congenial subject to labour audiences. The word 'Empire' has a military sound, and the thing which it denotes was in a vague

way held to be the outcome and embodiment of militarism, the result of conquest and annexation, of unwarrantable subjection of other peoples and appropriation of their lands. This impression was strengthened by the South African War, ending, as it did, in the merger of two republi ' in the British Empire. It was not shared to any appreciable extent by the overseas democracies. Jealous of their autonomy, they were at the same time, so far as the British populations were concerned, proud of the Empire, resolute to maintain it, and not averse to extending it. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, it is true, was very insistent upon the text that Canada must not be drawn into what he was fond of styling the vortex of European militarism. His was a French Canadian point of view, and there was also in South Africa, inevitably, a Boer point of view. But in the all-British Dominions of Australasia, the predominant feeling of the democracies was in no way hostile—on the contrary, actively loyal—to the Empire as it stood, and more than ready to enlarge it. Their feeling was illustrated by the action of Queensland in annexing New Guinea in 1883, and by the exasperation which was felt and loudly expressed in Australia, when the Home Government refused to endorse the action of the colony, with the result that the Germans established themselves in the Pacific.

The feeling among labour circles in the United Kingdom with regard to the Empire was the result of class prejudice, combined with ignorance of history. The teaching of overseas history in the schools had been inadequate, and the facts had not been presented in their true light. The charge of militarism was not

countered, for instance, by pointing out how time after time the Home Government declined to annex and refused proffered additions to the Empire. There was the case just mentioned, and a similar instance was that of East Africa, where the whole central coast-line was offered to Great Britain by the Sultan of Zanzibar and not accepted, again with the result that the Germans came in. It was not met by quoting the case of the Ionian Islands, in which, in contradiction to Adam Smith's saying that ' no nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any Province ', Great Britain, of her own free will and under no stress of war, relinquished a dependency. Nor was use made of many other cogent arguments and illustrations—all incontrovertible history. But, most of all, the teaching did not insist upon the bed-rock fact that the Empire is, and has been, from first to last, the result, not of artificial handiwork but of natural growth. It is perfectly true that a great deal of the Empire has accrued in the train of war, but less than is commonly supposed is the outcome of conquest, and comparatively little is the result of intended and premeditated conquest. In a list of the British possessions, and of the mode of acquisition in each case, Canada might be found registered as acquired by conquest or cession. What was conquered or ceded ? At most the eastern part of the present Dominion of Canada, up to and including the Great Lakes. This no doubt opened a large hinterland to Great Britain and closed it to France, but this hinterland was not conquered from France. The original British claim to the Hudson Bay Territories was as good as or better than the

French claim. The origin of British Columbia as a British possession had no connexion whatever either with conquest or with Canada or with France. Malta is a British possession which came into the hands of Great Britain by the wish and with the free-will consent of the inhabitants of Malta, as is told in the well-known Latin inscription at Valletta. It became British not by conquest but by the opposite to conquest, but at the same time British ownership of the island was the result of war—the Napoleonic wars. If there had not been war in which Great Britain was involved, Malta might never have become a part of the British Empire.

The lessons of the late war on this particular subject are peculiarly instructive and provide the most effective answer that could be given to the doctrine that the Empire is the result of militarism. The island of Cyprus had been occupied and administered by Great Britain since 1878 under a peaceful and friendly agreement with Turkey, who owned the island by right of conquest. It was held on a kind of lease, a fixed annual payment being made to the Porte. When Turkey came into the war as an ally of Germany and an enemy of Great Britain, the British Government forthwith annexed the island, and it became British soil, one of His Majesty's possessions, Turkish sovereignty being wholly eliminated. This was the result of war, but there was no conquest about it. No resort to force of any kind was necessary. The Turkish inhabitants of the island were given the option of retaining their Ottoman allegiance or becoming British subjects, and, with a very few individual exceptions, they all readily

accepted the latter alternative. The case of Egypt was similar. Here, as in Cyprus, Great Britain was already virtually supreme before the war, but she had no formally recognized position in preference to other European Powers interested in Egypt, and Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was still intact. Turkey having become an enemy Power, her suzerainty was cancelled; a formal British Protectorate was proclaimed; and the native ruler of Egypt was given the title of Sultan, to indicate complete independence from the overlordship of Turkey. Egypt thus came, as a Protected Sultanate, like other Protected Principalities, within the sphere of the British Empire. This was the result of war; but, at any rate in this concluding phase which definitely settled the status of Egypt in its relation to Great Britain, there was nothing of the nature of conquest. On the other hand, British conquest was in evidence in the late war, on an immense and unprecedented scale. In no previous war, probably, in which Great Britain took part, not even in the Seven Years' War, was so large an area conquered by British Arms. In Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, the amount of territory conquered was very great; much of it will no doubt be retained under one guise or another; and the result will be an Empire further enlarged by forcible acquisition. The new additions are not only the outcome of war, they are the direct product of conquest. But no sane human being imagines that Great Britain and the British Empire went into the war with the object of annexing more lands and subjecting more peoples, that the British peoples took up arms, like the Germans, 'according to plan', with premeditated

schemes of aggrandizement. Great Britain joined in the war to keep her faith to other peoples and to safeguard her own existence. For these ends, it was necessary to carry the war into her enemies' territories, to invade and to conquer, the conquest being, as a matter of fact, a process of national insurance, so far as the conquerors were concerned, and a process of liberation, so far as the conquered were concerned. The facts are clear, beyond all possibility of question—the reluctance to go into the war, the efforts made to avoid it, no less than the wholesale conquests which ensued.

If regard be had to causes and motives, indeed in all respects, this latest and greatest war was probably also the cleanest war in which the British nation or Commonwealth ever took a hand. But it differed from other wars in degree only, not in kind, and past history should be read and taught in the light which it has given. Very few British wars have been wars of aggressive conquest, that is, deliberately provoked and waged for definite purposes of forcible annexation. India, in past times, was a great scene of British conquest, and it was the sphere of the greatest of British chartered companies, which are often attacked, in some instances with good reason, for aggressive aims and methods. But the English never overran India in a wave of conquest, as the Spaniards overran tropical America. They neither could do so nor wished to do so. Wars are expensive, and in their own interests merchants avoid them, if they are to bear the responsibility and the expense. The English were 40 years in India before they owned a foot of soil, and for the better part of

a century their policy was one of eschewing war and dominion. The many subsequent wars were nearly always the outcome of circumstances, not of design, beginning with intent to safeguard what was in being, and ending with additional gains. There are many blots on the past history of the English in India, but it does not illustrate wholesale lust of conquest. Great Britain never placed individual embodiments of militarism at the head of her State, unless Cromwell, who was the product of advanced democracy, comes in this category. She never bred a Philip II, a Louis XIV, a Frederick the Great, a Napoleon, a Kaiser William. Yet it had long been her turn to breed a militarist of this type, if she had it in her blood. With none of them, except Frederick the Great, was she in amity. She was their enemy and compassed their defeat. The British Empire grew under Queen Victoria, most peace-loving of sovereigns, far more than under any other King or Queen. When, in her reign, and afterwards, the self-governing colonies undertook to provide their own armies, they did not call them armies, but Defence Forces. Because Great Britain is an island, her chief weapon was always, and necessarily, sea power. Because sea power was her weapon, she fought her enemies across the seas and crippled them by attacking their outlying possessions. Eventually she appropriated not a few of them; and, as in the case of Turkey in the late war, so in previous wars, the nations who were dragged into war against her by her main enemy suffered at her hands in loss of territory no less than, sometimes more than, the main enemy. But it was very rarely matter of design; and when it was matter

of design, as was, for instance, the conquest of Canada, it was design for defence rather than offence, for security, not for empire in the militarist sense. In a word, the late war has writ large the plain record of the British Empire. It is to a considerable extent the result of war, but it is not, and never has been, the product or the expression of militarism.

Equality

Equality, in a greater or lesser degree, is of the essence of democracy, and one main result of the war has been extension of equality in all directions. The war was fought and won to checkmate the attempt of one powerful nation to dominate others, to safeguard, as far as is humanly possible, for all time the equal rights of small and great peoples. To perpetuate equal rights is the object of the League of Nations: it aims at recognition of equality as the permanent basis of international relations. Social equality, equality of classes, has been greatly promoted by the war, which, in this respect, has especially leavened the home democracy. Class distinctions in the United Kingdom have been inherited from the past; they have survived, modified from generation to generation, in the slow process of broadening out which has marked British character and British history, and have been kept alive by the spirit of practical neighbourly kindliness, which, in spite of much that is said and not a little that is done to the contrary, has always been a marked feature of British men and women in all grades of life. Such distinctions do not exist, or exist to only a limited extent, in the overseas democracies: they are out of

place and time in new countries, whose conditions of necessity produce equality. It was in the old country that the equalizing effect of war was most in evidence, because there was more to equalize. There cannot be a great national upheaval, without bringing in its train a great increase of class equality : a whole people cannot take up arms without being made more uniform by the process : the basis of conscription is equal liability to military service. In the old British Army, as a general rule, the officers belonged to one class, and the rank and file to another. The unprecedented size of the army in the late war, and the terrible wastage through casualties, inevitably greatest in proportion among the officers, resulted in a very large number of promotions from the ranks. The army became a more democratic army than any British army since Cromwell's time. The same process went on in civil life, in consequence of the war. Gaps had to be filled ; the fittest had to be taken, irrespective of social standing ; science, enlisted in this war as never before, knows nothing of social distinctions ; wealth, in spite of inevitable profiteering, was infinitely more evenly distributed ; and over and above all, the nation being at a life and death crisis, these distinctions took their rightful place as minor matters, and naturally receded into the background. One effect of this equalizing of classes in the United Kingdom has been to make the conditions of the Mother Country less unlike those of the Overseas Dominions, and to that extent to bring the various British democracies nearer together.

Similarly, the war has made for equality of the sexes. It has been seen that the Dominion of Canada, as the

result of the war, has followed the example of Australia and New Zealand in giving the vote to all adults, women as well as men, and that the old-fashioned Mother Country has gone far in the same direction. The war provided women with an opportunity of practically proving their own case, by taking over, at the time of trouble, much of men's work and doing it well. They earned their right to be citizens: the war gave them their opportunity and they took it. Once again the war has vindicated—within limits—equality of colour and race. From the first, it was not, like the South African War, exclusively a white man's war. Men of all colours fought, fell or came out, served in one capacity or another, side by side, not in the coloured man's lands alone, in Asia or Africa, but on the fronts in Europe. Algerians and Senegalese in the French Army; Indian troops, coloured West Indians, New Zealand Maories, and others in the British forces; behind the lines, in Labour Corps, Fijians, South African natives, Chinese; all races and colours were represented. Within limits, but only within limits, the war has made for equality in this matter of colour. In other words, it has not in any way weakened the barriers of nature and made intermixture of radically different races either more likely or more desirable. Nor has it modified public opinion where national policy is concerned: the determination of Australians to keep Australia a white Australia is as fixed as ever. But it has lessened the prejudice against the coloured man simply because he is coloured, and has made the white man estimate the coloured man by similar standards to those which he applies to his own white

race, instead of arrogantly grouping all coloured men in one and the same category of uniform inferiority. It was the Prime Minister of Canada who moved a notable resolution at the Imperial War Conference of 1917, affirming that, in any future readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire, India should, side by side with the self-governing Dominions, receive full recognition as an important portion of the Imperial Commonwealth, having a right, together with the Dominions, to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations; while another resolution, cordially and unanimously supported by the representatives of the self-governig Dominions, accepted the principle of reciprocity of treatment between them and India. Further, the war has made the overseas democracies more ready than they were before to differentiate between coloured men who are British subjects and those who are not. For with this phase of equality the overseas democracies are specially concerned. Owing to their greater proximity to the coloured men's lands, or to the presence of coloured men in their midst, the colour question has a more immediate and living interest for them than for the home democracy. It may be added that, as regards recognition of race equality, New Zealand holds an honourable pre-eminence among the Dominions, the New Zealand Maories having their own representatives in the Dominion Parliament and a Maori minister in the Cabinet.

Closely allied to, and in part identical with, this tendency towards equalization of race and colour as the result of the war, is the effect which the war has

had in the direction of equalizing continents. From an historical point of view this is perhaps the most interesting of all its results. From the date when the Turkish and Saracen waves of invasion into Europe reached high-water mark, spent themselves and began to recede, modern history has been the history of one continent—Europe—invading, overflowing into, dominating other continents. The first substantial uprising against this one-continent domination came from the European race itself. The independence of the United States, achieved in 1783, marked the beginning of a new era, in which the other continents should not be merely the handmaids of Europe. It was followed later by the promulgation of the Monroe doctrine, which was a blunt intimation to Europe not to trespass on America; and it is significant that the United States said the last word in the late war, which in turn has said something like the last word as to the future relations of continents. It is very interesting, too, to note that the war has had the double effect, on the one hand of finally closing the chapter of mediaeval Asiatic intrusion into Europe by practically eliminating the Turkish Power from Europe, and, on the other, of enlisting forces from all the outer continents to come to Europe and settle its future, in lieu of Europe, as in past times, exclusively deciding the destinies of the whole world. The European race stands very much where it did, with the exception that other races, as has been noted, have received fuller recognition; but Europe as a continent does not. All the continents, with no exception, were represented on the Western front, in the very heart

of Europe, pre-eminently America, including, from within the British Empire, Canadians, Newfoundlanders, and West Indians. For the first time in history, the Southern Hemisphere took a hand in a world settlement, and its fighting men, Australians, NewZealanders, South Africans, held a front place in Europe. Asia and Africa were both in evidence. Many can recall the heated debates in Parliament in 1878, when a British Government had had the temerity to bring a small detachment of Indian troops merely to the fringe of Europe, to the island of Malta. In the late war, the first welcome accession from overseas to the hard-pressed British Army in France came from India. Apart from the Armies in Europe, Japan joined in the war on the footing of one of the Great Allied Powers. Our own India, as we have seen, in the course of the war and as resulting from the war, obtained recognition as one of the partner peoples within the Empire. A new Arab power came into existence and took effective part in the war, more or less on the basis of equality and independence. The effort of Asia indicated much more equality and much less subordination than Europe had contemplated in times past.

At the same time, as in the case of race and colour, so in that of continents, the tendency towards equalization has only been within limits. Where the continents are not mainly white continents, it *is* a matter of race and colour, and there is one continent which is a notable instance to the contrary of what has been said. In spite of the fact that Africans have been fighting in Europe, Africa remains pre-eminently a dependent

continent, more dependent upon Europe than it ever was, with the exception of one State. That exception is the Union of South Africa, which is in real fact the only community in Africa standing securely upon its own bottom. There are only two nominally independent States in Africa—Abyssinia, whose independence is jointly guaranteed by France, Italy, and Great Britain, and the Republic of Liberia, which owes the doubtful blessing of its independence, as it owes its origin, to the benevolent interest of the United States. Excluding these two States, and excluding the South African Union, the whole of Africa is a dependency of Europe. Africa illustrates the danger of dependence, and gives good reason why, from the world point of view, growing equality should be welcomed. It cannot be doubted that African questions and African possibilities were potent among the causes of the late war, and the most unanswerable justification for excluding Germany wholly from Africa lies in the fact that a would-be dominating Power, skilled in the art of drilling and organization, adept at creating a privileged military caste, could find an almost boundless field and an almost inexhaustible reservoir of Janissaries on the African continent. It also suggests another danger of a diametrically different kind, that of undoing whatever good has been achieved through dependence, by attempting prematurely to introduce equality, by prescribing, or trying to prescribe, for races and peoples in a low stage of development, political methods and systems which are only applicable to adult communities.

Self-determination has been a favourite phrase of

latter-day democracy, suggesting a plebiscite or a referendum. As applied to tribes or races of Central Africa, it could be only either meaningless or positively harmful. Equally harmful would be internationalization—another long and well-sounding word—if it implies actual administration by more than one Power. It has already been tried and disastrously failed. Divided control means anarchy. The future of native races lies in trusteeship, exercised by a single nation, acting in its own right, or, if as the Mandatory of a League of Nations, untrammelled by other than such general rules as have been already approved and observed in practice by right-minded peoples and governments. The best trustee must necessarily be a nation, such as our own, which has had long training in this highly-skilled work and has bred for many generations a school of men with ample store of precedents and traditions as to what to do and what to avoid, relying on justice rather than force, and promoting the development of the native races on their own lines and through their own usages in preference to worrying them into alien and unaccustomed ways.

Nationhood and Nationalism

India has been the widest and most conspicuous field of British administrative success, as it has been the greatest school for British Administrators. This does not imply any pretence that sins of commission and omission have not been plentiful during the three centuries of British connexion with India; but it is beyond question or challenge that, on a balance of the account, British control has resulted in a large

measure of comparative well-being and contentment among the very many millions of very diverse inhabitants of the Indian peninsula. This result has been achieved by British methods of maintaining and enforcing a few sound general rules, while allowing much variety in their application. The King Emperor's proclamations are to the Princes and Peoples of India. The territories directly under British rule, themselves in different stages of administration, are side by side with the Feudatory Native States, under native rule but with British Residents to advise the rulers. There has been no attempt to drill into uniformity, and the outcome has been growing sense of partnership in the Empire and growing sense of nationhood in India itself. A single Power has exercised general and undisputed control from above. This single control has been coupled with the unifying effect of railways, of irrigation works, which, it will be noted, tend to remove desert barriers, and to make population more evenly distributed and more continuous, and with other fruits of modern science. In the result a sense of something like oneness, of nationhood, is beginning to take root in a soil to which it had always been alien, and which would never have been implanted in it by force alone. This sense of nationhood, the outcome of growth under the single trustee, was in evidence before the war, but has been greatly quickened and promoted by the war, in India as elsewhere in the Empire. India claimed to take part in the war, in her own right, as being part of the Empire which was at war. It was not so much a case of answering to a call as of making a demand and asserting a claim.

The native Indian army had been excluded from the South African War. This exclusion was not to the liking of India. It differentiated between white and coloured and placed, or seemed to place, India on a lower level than the white provinces of the Empire. The later and greater war gave an opening to redress the balance. It was splendidly taken, and was followed, as has been noted, by formal recognition of India, by common consent, in the Councils of the Empire.

The growth of nationhood in India is a change in kind, and a change which can hardly be assured in permanence for many generations to come. Nationhood is a phase of equality, and equality is not indigenous to the East, where the political and social basis has rather been one of domination and dependence. Where it has come into being in the democratic sense which we attach to the word, as denoting something more than race kinship, it has been, as in Japan, the result of assimilating European institutions and modes of thought. It is inconceivable that, if the single control which Great Britain exercises over India were removed, the many diverse Princes and peoples would still hold together. Growth of nationhood in the Dominions, on the other hand, is not a change in kind, but only of degree. One strong reason, among many, for more extended teaching of overseas history in our schools and colleges, is that in overseas history alone can the beginnings of nations be traced with absolute certainty. The United States, Canada, Australia, are modern creations. There is no mist or uncertainty whatever as to how they came into being and how and why they grew ; as to what causes produced the effects.

When British citizens went across the sea, they carried with them British freedom and British citizen rights. They went out as equals of, not as subordinate to, the British citizens who remained behind. Self-government in their new homes, when it came, came for a British race in the order of nature; and self-government, coupled with the coalescing of small self-governing communities into larger self-governing wholes, meant, and could only mean, the beginnings of new British nations. But they were still within the Empire, and wished to remain within the Empire; and in relation to foreign peoples, the Mother Country, the home of the common sovereign and of the original Parliament, still represented and spoke for the Empire. The nationhood of the self-governing Dominions, accordingly, was not complete. It could only be completed, either by their ceasing to belong to the Empire, or by some readjustment by which they would formally, as well as in point of fact, add their voice to that of the Mother Country in speaking for the Empire, and in deciding the foreign policy of the Empire. Thus, at the 1917 Conference, Sir Robert Borden emphasized the fact that attainment of full citizenship involved a voice in foreign relations; the phrase 'equality of nationhood' was used; and the resolution of the Conference as to the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire after the war laid down, in words which have been already quoted, that recognition should be given to the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy. Evidence of such recognition has been given by the presence of repre-

sentatives of the outer Empire at the Peace Conference.

In every possible way the war enlarged the nationhood of the Dominions. It was their contention that they came into the war 'on their own', on the partner basis, not merely to help the Mother Country in time of trouble, but jointly, severally, and equally with the Mother Country, to preserve the Empire, of which, no less than the Mother Country, they were integral parts. It was their war as much as Great Britain's. The magnitude and the prolongation of the war told in the same direction, proportionately to its greatness and to its length. If it had been a short war, still the contingents would have been national contingents to a far greater extent than before; but, as it grew in size and in duration, the contingents—speaking generally, for there were for instance exceptional conditions in South Africa—swelled to the proportion of national armies: the phrase 'Defence Forces' which, before the war, covered the various military organizations, became a misnomer; the Ministries of Defence were so many War Offices: the effort and the expenditure were the effort and the expenditure of peoples fighting for their lives as peoples. Everything that could be magnified was magnified, including the status of each Dominion. Within each Dominion, the war told heavily in favour of unity and consolidation. The mere fact that the Defence of the Realm Acts placed an immense and abnormal power in the hands of the Central Government tended to make the people one people, more of a nation. Especially was this the case in the loosely federated Australian Commonwealth,

where, under the Constitution Act, wide powers had been left to the component states. Concentration was a necessity : Coalition Governments, as has been seen, were the rule rather than the exception : the communities acted more than ever as single units with a common will and purpose, with a national instinct called into play continuously. The closing down of enemy trade and the elimination of enemy traders had the same effect. Where German combines had gained a hold on Australian ores and metal industries, for German control was substituted Australian control, national control, not by negotiation or compromise or through private intermediaries, but by the direct strong-handed action of the national Government on behalf of the nation. Growing difficulty of sea transport, coupled with unceasing and increasing efforts to co-operate with the Mother Country and meet her requirements, meant self-help and self-reliance in each Dominion in corresponding degree. The inventiveness of war is specially fruitful in new countries, developing existing resources, creating new industries ; and the necessities of wartime bring to new enterprises infinitely more Government initiative and support than is the case under normal conditions. Government calls in science and appoints scientific research committees : the ventures, the experiments, become the concern of the State, of the nation, and are not left to private citizens to begin and carry on at their own risk, profit, or loss. Shortage of shipping led to the beginnings or the development of shipbuilding in Australia and Canada. The Commonwealth Government bought a line of steamers. The need for munitions for the British

and Allied armies called into being the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada, operating on an immense scale from ocean to ocean, working, it is true, directly under the British, not the Dominion Government, but none the less giving a very great stimulus to Canada as a manufacturing nation. During the war again, the Dominion Government bought up the Canadian Northern system, moving in the direction of nationalizing the railways of the Dominion. In a word, the Dominions emerged from the war with adult nationhood asserted, recognized, illustrated, strengthened at all points and in all ways.

From this it follows that equal partnership is the only possible basis for United Empire in future, and that any course which tends or even seems to conflict with this principle would court disaster. Further, the war has emphasized the particular direction in which, as a practical and living matter, equality has still to be fully registered, because the meaning of war has now been brought home, as never before, to the various democracies, and control of foreign relations means decision as to whether, when occasion arises, there shall or shall not be war. The resolution to hold an annual Imperial Cabinet is a considerable and most practical step towards this joint control, and along the lines of Imperial Cabinet and Imperial Conference the future is likely to move, in other words, along the lines of closer co-operation, but not of more formal union. For, starting from the thesis, which is not open to doubt, that nationhood is the bed-rock henceforth of relations within the Empire, there seem to be two safe deductions. The first is that an Imperial

Parliament is farther off than it was before the war, for the simple reason that an Imperial Parliament cannot be created without to some extent curtailing the power of the present national Legislatures. The second is that, inasmuch as the young nations, having but lately obtained nationhood, are specially jealous to uphold it, any overtures for closer union should come from them rather than from the Mother Country, lest the latter should seem to attempt to dictate as predominant partner, predominant by right of centuries and for the present, though not for the future, by numbers of population.

The wholesome feeling of nationhood, so far as it militates against the probability of an Imperial Parliament, is, in two of the Dominions, reinforced by the much less wholesome sentiment of nationalism. Nationhood is one thing, nationalism is another, and they conflict; but the latter can be dressed up in the guise of the former, and the ample pronouncements, which have been made in connexion with the war and the Peace as to the rights of small nationalities, have been appropriated as applicable to their own case by Dutch nationalists in the South African Union, and nearer home, by Sinn Feiners in Ireland. How far has the war strengthened or weakened nationalism in Canada and South Africa, where there are two distinct white races? In all countries, at all times, there is a section of citizens usually negligible in number and influence, who, for one reason or another, whether as conscientious fanatics or as habitual Pharisees, are habitually in opposition to the overwhelming majority of their fellow countrymen. In

wartime they come out as Pacifists and the like; and, if there is any race cleavage, they can reinforce it. Where there is no race cleavage, some other element, such as extreme class antagonism, does its best to supply the place. In proportion as war unites the vast majority, it intensifies the sectional feeling of the small minority, and where there is race cleavage, the sectional feeling has a double backing. This is the temporary result of war; how far any permanent result is produced is another matter. In Canada, extreme French Canadian nationalists opposed the war, and the ordinary French Canadian habitant, being very unwarlike, was only too glad of any lead in the direction of remaining passively at home. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the recognized and deservedly honoured leader of the French Canadians, though not of French Canadian nationalists, threw himself heart and soul into the war; but he strongly opposed compulsory military service, and to that extent came into line with nationalist sentiment. A considerable number of his English-speaking Liberal supporters followed his lead, but on the whole the General Election on the conscription issue became to a noteworthy extent an electoral fight between French Canada and British Canada. Racial feeling, already strong because French Canadians had made such a poor response to the call to arms, and because nationalist leaders had openly denounced the war and Great Britain, was further embittered. At the time of the election there was much excitement in the Province of Quebec and, when conscription was carried, there was some rioting, violent speeches, and loose talk about Quebec seceding from the

Dominion. Claims to exemptions, for which the law gave full opening, were inordinately multiplied, but eventually the Act was firmly though temperately enforced, Laurier and other responsible French leaders discountenanced resistance to what had now become the law of the land, and the situation gradually quieted down. In South Africa, the position was at once more serious in degree and different in kind. As is well remembered, the decision of the Union Government to take an active part in the war was followed by open rebellion. The apologists of the rising treated it as what they called an armed protest against the action of the Government in invading German South-west Africa, instead of being content to remain on the defensive; in other words, they favoured neutrality as between Great Britain and Germany. The Government was in the main a Boer Government with a Boer Prime Minister, and there was no issue, as in the case of conscription in Canada, which united the non-British race. The situation, in fact, was more like that which resulted from the attempt to carry conscription in Australia. Labour was thereby divided in Australia, as the Boers were divided in South Africa, sectional or nationalist bitterness being, in either case, intense against the Prime Minister from their own ranks or race. The General Election which was held in South Africa during the war much increased the number of nationalists in the Union Parliament; they had in Hertzog an able and astute leader; and throughout the war, nationalism was a far more real and present danger than it was in Canada. In either Dominion extreme nationalism could achieve its purpose, either by secession

from the Dominion or Union of a predominantly nationalist part or parts, or by inducing the whole Dominion or Union to secede from the Empire, the first of these two alternatives following out race cleavage still farther, the second sinking or appearing to sink race cleavage in a more wholesale political severance. The first alternative was not promising in either Canada or South Africa, for it was most unlikely that the majority of the citizens of the new nations would consent to their own dissolution. In spite of the tendency of the Boers, which has been abundantly illustrated in history, to split up into small communities, it was perhaps even less promising in South Africa than in Canada. Boers and British are on the whole more intermixed in South Africa than French and British in Canada. They are not so much divided by religion. French Canadians are somewhat more concentrated in Canada than the Dutch in South Africa, and the stronghold of French Canadian nationalism, the province of Quebec, is not, like the overwhelmingly nationalist Orange Free State, the centremost province of the Federation or Union. The efforts of Hertzog have therefore been directed, not so much to breaking off a province from the Union, as to detaching the Union from the Empire. In other words, he has tried to exploit nationhood in the interests of nationalism, and he could appeal to republican sentiment and so-called lost liberties, for which there was no modern counterpart in Canada. This is the practical danger of nationalism, that it may be a nucleus for something more, combining with other extremes, such as class enmity, or with affronted nationhood. Whence comes the conclusion,

already emphasized, that no semblance of affront must be offered to the nationhood of a self-governing Dominion.

That for the time being the war has intensified nationalist sentiment seems beyond question. But whether that sentiment will have been permanently strengthened is much more doubtful. As has been suggested, the shaping of democracies depends to an almost incalculable extent upon the individual leader, and statesmanship of a high order has been in evidence both in Canada and in South Africa. Though it is dangerous to prophesy, and for the moment the outlook in South Africa is not reassuring, on the whole there is a reasonable probability that eventually nationalism will be found to have lost rather than gained ground. A considerable minority of the non-British race in either Dominion, representing the best of the race, have been brothers in arms with their British fellow citizens. They have led and followed each other in turn, and comradeship in war is a great cement. This means that an appreciable proportion of both races will have been brought closer together than ever before. Moreover, they have been associated in a great success, whereas the nationalists have been conspicuous as 'backing the wrong horse', and, human nature being what it is, are proportionately discredited. In South Africa, the Union will surely have something substantial to show for the war in German South-west Africa; the fact that Boer generals won so much distinction in the war should also tell; and meanwhile the years are running on, away from the main source of bitterness, the South African War, at the same time making

the novel conditions of a self-governing Dominion more familiar to Boer minds. In Canada, it may be presumed that feeling among the majority of slow-thinking French Canadians will be much where it was before the war, but it may well be tempered with the reflection that, in the matter of achieving any practical or useful result, nationalism during the war was a complete failure and succeeded only in alienating sympathy both in and out of Canada.

Air Power

Reference has been made to the inventiveness of war. This has been very especially illustrated by the extraordinary progress made in the art of flying during and because of the war. No invention was ever developed so rapidly as flying was between August 4, 1914, and November 11, 1918. From being a probably useful accessory to war, it became one of its main ingredients, and the Under-Secretary for Air, General Seely, stated as his own personal opinion in the House of Commons, on March 13, 1919, that the proportion of Air Force to Land and Sea Forces would be an ever-growing proportion, that possibly in a few years Air Power might make fleets and armies as they are to-day obsolete. Yet flying is still in little more than infancy. Nor is it an invention, like that of the tanks, designed and adapted, if not exclusively, at any rate mainly, for war purposes. It is for all time and for all the world in the widest sense, for peace at least as much as for war. During the war, the French experimented with an aerial postal service in 30 hours across the Sahara, between Algiers and Timbuctoo. British trial flights

multiplied after the signing of the armistice. The statement of March 13 recorded that air routes had been or were being surveyed from Cairo to Karachi in India and from Cairo to the Cape; that science was continuously at work, improving and supplementing, attaining more accuracy, greater carrying power, additional speed. Transit at 100 miles an hour, already a moderate speed in the air, is double the rate at which an express train travels. What is likely to be the effect upon the British Empire of this mastery of the air?

The essence of the Empire is that its nucleus is and has always been an island, and that, largely for that reason, the King's possessions outside the homeland are and always have been in modern history at a distance from the Mother Country and scattered in all directions. Till it was given up to Germany, Heligoland was the nearest colonial possession or outpost. There has been no element in the Empire of nearness or of continuity, and communication has been wholly by sea. Distance and sea power have made the Empire what it is. The problems have been problems of distance. Self-government is the outcome of distance; if the self-governing Dominions had adjoined the Mother Country, the reason for self-government, that British citizens could not exercise their citizen rights in the old legislature and therefore must have new Legislatures of their own, would not have existed. Long before the war, science had been busily at work, minimizing distance by steam and electricity, making communication not only more rapid but also more regular and constant; but flying, especially as developed

by the war, has incalculably added to this growing diminution or elimination of distance. It has come at a stage in the history of the Empire when distance has already done its main work, after, not before, the making of new nations, and the work cannot be undone, even if any one were foolish enough to wish it undone. But in the future the problems of the relations between the component parts of the Empire will no longer be, to anything like the same extent as in the past, problems of distance. The future will be marked by constantly and rapidly growing nearness. This does not necessarily mean the solution of difficulties. For instance, the proximity of Algeria to France has rather complicated than facilitated the relations between the two countries. French policy has wavered between treating Algeria as one with the Mother Country and dealing with it as a distinct unit of the French colonial Empire. Moreover, the same forces which bring the component parts of an Empire nearer to each other bring them in the same degree nearer to foreign nations. But on the balance, it can hardly be doubted that new facilities for transit and quicker communication must lead to closer co-operation and better understanding, and that in this respect the air promises to supply a fresh link between the widely sundered provinces of the Empire.

So much for elimination of distance. But Air Power is also likely to affect Imperial relations in another and a different way. Apart from community of race, language, and so forth, and where community of race and language is non-existent, the two most potent bonds of Empire at the present day are probably the

Crown and the British Navy. As the personal embodiment of the race and the Empire the common sovereign is a great element of unity. The British monarchy carries with it peculiarly British traditions; it has widened out as the race and the Empire have widened; it is an institution at once time-honoured and markedly well adapted to present-day conditions. The King is the recognized personal head of a worldwide household of endless diversities but rooted in the past. He provides unity without interference. The British Navy may be classed as an Institution. It has enlisted sentiment behind it in an extraordinary degree, ultimately based no doubt upon its proved priceless past and present worth, but not measured by material considerations alone. From the days of Queen Elizabeth, the Navy has been the embodiment of the special genius of the race; it has been the prime product of the many-harboured mother islands; the sea has been the British heritage; in sea power Great Britain has continuously led the world. The Navy has a hold upon the affections of the peoples of the Empire which is never shaken. A strong navy is almost the only issue upon which all parties in all parts of the British Commonwealth are at one. In Blackstone's words, 'The Royal Navy of England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament'. It has been in a special sense and a peculiar degree not only the main safeguard of United Empire, but also its most typical expression. The self-governing colonies began and developed their own individual land Defence Forces long before any substantial beginning was made of Dominion fleets. In the early years of the present

century all the self-governing colonies or Dominions, except Canada, contributed to the Royal Navy. It was not until 1909 that Australia definitely entered upon the construction of a Commonwealth fleet, and Canada did not pass a Naval Service Act in the same direction till 1910. Gifts from overseas in money or kind towards the armed strength of the Mother Country in time of menace from foreign nations have been directed to the Navy, not to the Army. Such were the splendid gifts of battle cruisers before the war from New Zealand and from the Malay States. When Sir Robert Borden came into power in Canada, and tried to initiate a more active and effective naval policy for the Dominion than that of his predecessors, his proposals for the time being were to add to the Royal Navy from Canadian funds three battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern type, to be placed at the disposal of the Crown for the common defence of the Empire. The Navy has lent itself more than the Army to specific gifts in kind, the nearest parallel on a small scale being one very much to the point, gifts of aeroplanes in the late war; and those who gave or offered ships did so feeling that they were contributing or proposing to contribute to the service which more than all others was a common service, the bulwark of all and the pride of all. Conversely, oneness in every sense has been the outstanding feature of naval policy at home, emphasized again and again at Imperial Conferences. The Admiralty doctrine has been that the sea is one, the Navy is or ought to be one; there should be no divided control; but if the Dominions prefer to have fleets of their own, the Royal Navy

will none the less continue to recognize that the whole Empire is in its charge, to be kept safe by concentration of naval force at the danger centre, not by dispersal through the world. In a word, the Navy has been at once the symbol, the embodiment, and the living safeguard of Imperial Unity.

How far is the position likely to be modified by Air Power? How far is the air going to override the sea? In the late war British strength at sea was as decisive a force as ever, perhaps more decisive than ever, and the air forces supplemented both sea and land forces and added to their effectiveness. But at the same time the war conclusively proved that flying has made the island less of an island, and that overwhelming strength at sea is no longer an all-sufficient preventive against invasion. How far is air power likely to supersede and supplant, in lieu of supplementing, sea power? If flying continues to make the astonishing progress which it made during the war, can the Navy possibly retain its at present unchallenged place as the main arm of England, and, in proportion as its relative importance declines, will not one very great bond of unity in the Empi · be loosened and tend to disappear? At the present stage the answers to these questions are matter for speculation: even scientific experts can only see the future through a glass darkly. But, however rapid may be the development of flying, it may reasonably be anticipated that the sea, and the Navy, whether upon or below the sea, will hold their own for some years to come; and even if they do not, there is ground for hope that the air and the planes and ships and men that traverse the air may be as

good friends to the British Empire as the sea and the Navy have been. Before the war, the Empire by no means held the first place in the air. Four years later the British Air Service was the best of all; and, as the flying man excelled in daring and in skill, so also the men of science were untiring in research and fruitful in discovery. There is surely something akin between the sailor's craft and that of the aviator, and qualities and traditions which have been nourished by the sea should not be out of place in the sphere of the winds. There is this yet further point. Very noteworthy was the extent to which our overseas brethren shared in the air warfare. Canadian pilots were specially conspicuous in number and in quality, as though the great Dominion was determined to compensate for having been behindhand on the sea by taking a lead in the air. The air is one, even more so than the sea. Here is a new service in which all the sons of the Empire have started together and learnt and worked together in an unprecedented degree, Australia having been the only Dominion which during the war developed a separate Air Force of its own. There is no question of priority in time, of Mother Country air squadrons born before the birth of the Dominions. The possibility, therefore, suggests itself of an Imperial Air Force, wholly outside and beyond any local Air Defence Forces, more representative of the Empire as a single unit than the Royal Navy itself, not fettered by any past, and not necessarily having its head-quarters either in the Mother Country or in any one of the self-governing Dominions.

General

In spite of what has been said as to the inventiveness of war, the late war, so Sir Douglas Haig has told us, has not given any new principles of warfare. Similarly, in its general effect upon the British Empire, it does not seem so far to have created anything that is fundamentally new; it has not overturned and revolutionized the past. What it has done has been greatly to magnify, widen, and accelerate tendencies and movements which were already in being. Magnifying has been its distinctive feature and its special work. Flying, already an accomplished fact before the war, has become an infinitely greater fact, and as the result, the elimination of distance, already in process, is being carried forward at an increased rate. Democracies have been made more democratic; young nations have grown alike in consciousness and in reality of nationhood; equality has been extended in all directions, to race, class, and sex; colour prejudice has been abated; the strength of labour has greatly grown; the claims of women have been largely met and universally recognized. Because the armies were on such a colossal scale, therefore conscription became a practical and living issue. The fact that British conquests of almost, if not wholly, unprecedented magnitude were the consequence of a war into which Great Britain entered for purely defensive purposes, has provided a magnifying glass under which to detect the true germs of former wars, and correctly to analyse causes and effects of past history. In a word, this war, in expanding and fructifying, rather than uprooting and reversing, has produced peculiarly British results for the British race—no doubt because it is the British race.

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